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Abstract 
The stimulate of this research seeks collaboration of firewalls 
which, could reach to the capability of distributed points of 
security policy; the front-end entity may much interact by the 
invaders so the separation between this entity and back-end entity 
to make the secure domain protection is necessary; collaborative 
security entity has the various task in the organization and there is 
a certain security policy to apply in; the entities like DPFF have to 
be protected from outsiders. 
Firewalls are utilized typically to be the main layer of security in 
the network framework. The research is presented the particular 
segment of the proposed framework that DPFF based on the 
developed iptable firewall to be the layers of defense, which is 
protected front and backend of the framework with a dynamic 
security and policy update to control the framework’s safeguard 
through proposed portion approach algorithm that utilize to reduce 
the traffic and efficiency in detection and policy update 
mechanism. The policy update mechanism for DPFF is given the 
way of its employment. 
The complete framework signifies a distributed firewall, where 
the administrator configures the policy rules set, which could be 
separately or else from administration nodes’ side. 
Keywords:  Distributed Packet Filtering Firewall, Cross-site, 
Demilitarized-zone, Extensible Mark-up Language, Berkeley 
Software Distribution 
1. Introduction 
A firewall is a hardware or software for defending the 
privacy, reliability, and accessibility of income and 
outcome packet over the network. Firewall expertise has 
enhanced significantly since it was introduced in the early 
1990s [4]. The premature firewall worked with simple 
packet-filtering firewalls, but it has been developed with 
more capability to rely on multiple layers of network 
activity. As the World Wide Web has developed into the 
progressive and complicated network of today, the Internet 
and network security [5], has become more problematical, 
with various attacks and break-ins. Nowadays firewall 
technology is a typical part of organizations to provide 
security of networks [2].  
 
In actual fact, today’s firewalls present a security fence 
between any networks, where the flow of traffic 
requirements to be controlled and observed [21]. To reduce 
network security risks, appropriate network access policies 
must be defined as first defend layer of defense in 
organizations’ strategy. Firewalls implement such policies. 
Firewall deployed polices traffic flows between internal 
and external networks.  The firewall application is to be a 
segment of typical security strategy, which cannot be 
lonely a most complete secure area [27]. These, such 
technologies essential are complemented with other 
security technologies that may provide a complete solution. 
 
Rules set policy let the firewall either permits or denies 
access to the network. Thus, a firewall may be placed to 
authorize all confident traffic and to deny all other requests, 
and in addition it may also set to deny all messages of a 
particular kind except of specified network addresses or IP 
domiciles.  Firewalls are intended to be a safeguard 
adjacent to effective endeavors of an assortment of security 
breaches. Firewall roll is to focus on security management 
[20], at a certain point; by this means abridge the 
accomplishment of security policy, the pathway of 
information and sometimes auditing. A firewall can also 
collect attack substantiation [10], to permit an organization 
to follow officially authorized action. 
 
There are limitations for the firewalls which unable them to 
defend hostile to malicious [25], insiders or unknown 
attacks or threats. In addition, firewalls are not mainly 
deliberate to defend against virus attack but some models 
propose to work as virus detector or protector to perform in 
arbitrary data packets passing through a firewall. 
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2. Background 
Firewall administrator typically, is located within the 
network administration to organize the services and give 
the individual effort to be comprehensive of policies and 
rules establishment in an organization. Based on a firewall 
definition by W. R. Cheswick, et al. [7], which design a 
firewall is for controlling all inside and outside traffic and 
just through it and traffic based on the authorization local 
security policy will only be allowed to pass and firewall 
itself should be protected and unaffected to penetration, and 
have a task with the collection of elements situated between 
two networks to conduct the mentioned properties. 
 
A research by E. D. Zwicky, et al. [29], has a broad 
description of firewalls fundamental, that they can be a 
secure checkpoint for inside and outside of a connection. 
The hosts available on a network could have any number of 
ordinary servers for various functionalities, so the lowest 
cost option is monitoring the router based on sophisticated 
fashion. A direction for multiple part of network with 
firewall control, which has the security restriction and 
implementing policy for multi-part, is given by J. D. 
Guttman [12]. In extension for different environment and 
have the distributed model which networks host may be 
employed in different portion and control by organization 
security policy is presented by S. M. Bellovin [3], S. 
Ioannidis, et al. [17]. However, M. Bellovin [3] has not 
given any report for implementation of this method. His 
approach proposed a few features of IP firewall 
functionality at the endpoints of the communications. One 
of the merits on this approach is employment of decision 
making at the certain location and receiving more 
information than a router through the firewall.  
 
A research by S. Ioannidis, et al. [17], focus on trusted 
management in the system and by modification of BSD 
kernel to support the implementation of firewall control at 
TCP connection, which was disregarding the router based 
firewall idea on decision making and an approach through 
the message header, but their goal was not a particular 
work on network environment for fully security structure 
and deployment. 
 
An enterprise or organizational security policy is 
undertaken and develop regards to threats [26], which the 
desirability and outcome and costs issues considered by M. 
Coetzee, and J. H. Eloff [8] and D. Moore, et al. [22]. 
Security’s analysis, which is a set of decision for permitting 
or denying different elements on a network based on the 
scope of organization is made. The setup of a firewall 
software or hardware is requiring a policy set on each node 
and implementation of that. As defining the policy for 
network control is important logging of this activity is 
much important. 
An automate development of policy by M. Hamdi, and N. 
Boudriga, [14], is developed different techniques in 
computer security by using attack graphs. The work is 
attempted for growing very large attack’s graph through 
pruning and management. The network policy tool was 
expanded by J. D. Guttman [13], which carried out on 
generation of route set as well as large filtering. This 
method utilized logical statement for required behavior on 
each node between the areas and truly implements the 
entire rule sets. 
 
To improve the security policy and protection of the 
Internet browser is presented by L. Huang et al. [15], is 
research on various types of browsers attack such as the 
network abilities’ interaction with client, threats scopes, 
network attacker, XSS phishing, malware, weak 
authentication and user tracking to control a web attacking 
by using a validate domain, certificates like SSL, HTTPS to 
prevent network attacks and also implementation difficult 
practice C. Jackson, and A. Barth  [18] and C. Jackson, and 
A. Barth [19], on resources. However this paper presented 
in our main research proposed model as the front end layer 
of the security in collaboration with Distributed Network 
Intrusion Detection System [30], [31] which located behind 
the Distributed firewalls to be two main components of the 
main research. 
3. Analysis of Firewall Activity 
In firewall activity, there are several queries about its 
activity and traffic control. Some of these enquiries are as 
follows: 
• Particular source and target and their services 
which may be accessible by source should be 
investigated. 
• Comparison between two distributed firewall for 
their configuration to have the corresponding 
enforce same policy. 
• Investigation about the active firewall and if one 
of them be active. 
• The influence of a node compromises to interface 
the firewall. 
• Investigation about the conducted policy 
configuration to meet the organization 
requirement. 
• All the open ports that may not to be open to 
inbound or outbound of the available nodes 
should be disabled. 
• The ports according to the organization policy, 
which require communicating, should be defined 
in firewall policy. 
• Correctness of the rules updated on the bases of 
organization policy should be examined. 
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With the appropriate examine procedures the firewall 
policy utilization base on its specification is interested to 
use and coincidence and conflict in policy should be 
indicated to the administrator. 
Our aim is an analysis that is based on applying the formal 
requirement to define the firewall policies and their 
relations, which assists to identify probable errors and 
firewall policies weaknesses aforementioned to their 
development in the framework. The store policy satisfies 
the conditions can be as following forms: 
If source IP and port and 
If target IP and port then 
Do exploit 
 
In the firewall filtering situation various conditions to 
satisfy the policy typically refers to equivalency between 
present packets of the current connection and the store 
policy which worked according to the applied algorithm. In 
our propose framework, every rule for the firewall is 
consists of six characteristics, which are in the following 
layout: 
< “Connection Protocol” “Source IP” “Source Port” 
“Target IP” “Target Port” “Action”> 
 
First part of packet is the protocol like UDP/TCP/ICMP. 
The next two parts are referred to IP domicile and port of 
source and also the next two parts to the source are the IP 
and port target of packet. Lastly, the final part is the action 
which decision of the firewall in upon it. 
Here we define the policy for the firewall activity that can 
have action according to the correlation of packets. 
 
The decision of the firewall to bypass the packet or drop is 
based on the comparison of the network fields and depends 
on the defined policies. The relation in the policy is defined 
by Pm, which contained all of current defined policy, which 
could be updated through Pn, which is the new rule that 
should compare with current policy by the using the 
analyzer. The result of comparison could be completely 
matched, almost match, incompletely match, completely 
disjoint and interrelated. The following example can show 
the correlated between Pm and Pn , and as it is shown may 
be some fields of Pm  are equal or subset to the equivalent 
of Pn, and also shows that the Pm policies are superset in 
comparing to Pn. 
 
Example: 
If a, b, c ∈{Connection Protocol, Source IP, Source Port, 
Target IP, Target Port} where a ≠b ≠c 
And also Pm[a] ⊂ Pn[a] or Pn[a] ⊂ Pm[a] or Pm[a] = 
Pn[a] then 
Pm[b] ⊂ Pn[b] and Pn[c] ⊂ Pm[c] 
That Implies: 
The Pm and Pn have interrelated policy. 
 
<TCP Protocol>, <Source IP 124.125.1.15>, <Any Port>, 
  <Any Target in Framework *.*.*.*> 
<8080> 
  <Not Permit Drop> 
 
The firewall activity and update filtering mechanism could 
be done based on the following flowchart (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Fig. 1 Proposed Firewall Activity and Update Filtering Mechanism 
Flowchart 
As it is shown in firewall connectivity of TCP/IP after 
receiving the packets (inbound and outbound) firewall 
performs to open command to receive and initial its 
investigation. In next firewall is starting to validate the 
packet based on its policies and somehow updating. In the 
parallel activity, firewall check for monitoring the network 
topology and its status. For the first part after monitoring 
the packet it will check for filtering, relay or update, in the 
second, the network topology it checks for capability of this 
topology, and in last, the status for immediate action and 
response is checked. 
3.1 Firewalls Limitation 
To briefly explain the limitation of the firewall as a front 
and backend first layer of defense in proposed security 
should mention that: 
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• Generally, a threat by using a mobile host 
communication can pass the firewall protection. 
• Internal treats cannot control by the firewall. 
 
Intrusion activity is not under control by the firewall. 
3.2 Access Control 
The main requirement to define a secure access control is to 
have trusted systems: 
• Environment Access: The method to support and 
guide the framework from intruders is to instigate 
trusted system technology like data access control 
that authenticated the users’ access and controls 
them. 
• Multi-Security Point: By defining several categories 
and points of data and users can be defined to access 
and the obligation in subject to at the high level of 
security the defined data level and user access is non 
comparative to the lower level, unless the valid user 
is authenticated. In this technique two parameters 
should be employed, first is accessing to the level of 
security, but only can read the available object, and 
second the object can modify and access to write in 
case the access permitted. 
• Monitor Orientation: on the bases of security 
parameters that define with framework policy the 
elements are control in the operating system and 
hardware. Security of the operating system kernel is 
an important matter to safeguard the framework and 
the next is monitoring the access privileges for each 
object and characteristics of protection. The security 
enforced the policy to conduct two previous 
property for all entities to reach to the following: 
o Security’s policy should be enforced for 
each access to the media. 
o The parser and analyzer due to the 
orientation monitoring will be safe from 
the modification or unconstitutional 
approach. 
o The testimony of the framework may 
observe by distributed administrators.  
3.3 Demilitarized Zone in the View of Firewall 
To the view of firewall position that applies in various 
cases to the requirement of allowing external access to 
some part of the proposed framework such as the mail and 
web activity the concept of a secure zone, which define as 
DMZ, is defined. The purpose of the DMZ is to supply the 
network segment which is externally accessible, and also 
internal services are provided to the public view. By this 
purpose, the other segments of the framework are separated 
from the main DMZ and have their own activity, so in this 
method unauthorized users are not permitted from 
accessing public resources. 
 
In circumstances of proposed framework servers are 
located on the same network segment behind the front 
firewall and before the backend firewall, and all inbound 
traffic is restricted as prior define. The main server as well 
as other servers are placed on the detach DMZ and 
connected to the firewall. The firewall policy for the 
security is set to permit all inbound connections through the 
port number 25 for the mail server located between two 
firewalls. In a worse case that an invader misused to reach 
to the administrator access, they may install a program for 
the full access through the back door software to the server. 
Nevertheless, since the servers as well as the mail server is 
not on the similar network segment as the other resources 
are and protected by the DMZ the hacker activity cannot be 
manipulated. As it has been explained in charter 6, the lure 
and interactive insecure segment of the network are always 
active specifically points the invaders to that parts of 
network.  
 
Operating a public main server over the Internet is 
hazardous [7]. However, in the pervious example the DMZ 
reduced the risk and does not let the server compromised 
with the aim of DPFF. It is very important at the time of 
conducting the DMZ the public view of servers does not 
have any connection like a back door to the internal 
network, which in the proposed model is again become 
secure by the backend firewall, otherwise invaders could 
bypass the DMZ and inter to the client and protected 
internal corporate network, and the individual associate 
between the subnet and the conducted DPFF.  
 
To provide beyond the security level multiple DMZ is 
offered in the proposed model. As per for the security 
reasons the following parameters are required to consider: 
• The DMZ should not connect directly to the internal 
network (to the other network segments), and it 
should be isolated. 
• As it has mention above the DMZ should not 
include the internal framework information that may 
be misused by the invaders. 
4. Feature Selection Approaches 
4.1 Characteristics of the First Layer Defense Security 
of the Proposed Framework 
The intended approach for the firewall application is sorted 
as (Fig. 2): 
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 Fig. 2  Proposed Model Strategy for the First Layer of Defense 
• All the network traffic (inbound and outbound) is 
essential passed through the firewall, which helps to 
obstruct all approach to the network except through 
the firewall (ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 2005). 
• Only legitimate traffic, which is defined by the 
restricted security policy maybe permitted to bypass 
the firewall. 
• Maintain the firewall protection to saturation with 
the utilization of a conviction system with the secure 
operating system. 
• Network packet filtering on the bases of IP 
domiciles, ports number and specified protocol. 
• Determination to permit or deny the network flows 
from the direction of the interest. 
4.2 Demonstration of Policy Mechanism 
The firewall investigates and checks every packet protocol 
and IP domicile information and after that it filters the 
outbound and inbound packets based on the set of security 
configuration policies. Accordingly, permission or 
dropping the packets are as the example of the following 
typically rules as well as particular policies, which may be 
updated through the analyzer and by administrator. 
• It drops all network packets, which may be subject 
to updating policy or administrator commands. 
• Limitless access to the web-server, which based 
mostly on port number 80. 
• Limitless access to port number 25 to access mail-
server through SMTP protocol. 
 
A firewall policy commands how the network traffic 
bypasses through firewall. The applicable policy also 
illustrates the firewall updating and restriction. To create 
the firewall policy various risk analyses should be carried 
out on the bases of a requirement for the execution of the 
organization. By an overview of this analysis list of 
applications and how it shall be secure is processed. With 
the knowledge based of the vulnerabilities, which is 
associated with each application, the particular method will 
be used for securing this application. The risk analysis 
should estimate according to the infrastructure but in the 
propose model the evaluation has been done the various 
elements like, vulnerabilities, threat and invader activity 
and with the impact of sensitive data available on the 
servers. By this goal, the evaluation of these elements 
aforementioned to determine the firewall policy is analyzed 
and the structure of handling applications traffic is 
processed. The particular of those applications, which 
could pass through the firewall and the activities, can take 
place by involving the following steps to create the firewall 
policy. 
• Recognition of vulnerabilities related with the 
essential application. 
• Analysis of the approach model for securing the 
applications’ investigation of protection method to 
create application traffic. 
• Establish of firewall policy is to support the 
application traffic. 
• Establish of firewall rules based on the IP domicile, 
ports and protocol. 
• Identification of the various conducted system 
vulnerabilities to update the policies. 
• Collaboration with other joint defense layers to 
completion of the policy. 
 
By referring to the nature of academic environment, the 
campus firewall cannot be setup to characteristics industry 
general standard. Due to an individual requirement of the 
security and depends on kind of data to be protected and 
confined the proposed model typically follow the maximize 
the network security environment to utilize the minimum 
risk. On this bases the requirement of the blocking the 
traffic is conducted on the followings: 
• All inbound traffic included ICMP traffic. 
• All inbound traffic from a source, which is nota 
valid source system with a targeting of the firewall 
address. 
• All outbound as well as inbound from a source 
system which may be in the range of private 
networks that may include in classes A, B and C of 
the network domicile.\ 
• All inbound traffic which maybe generated at the 
behind hand of the firewall that initiated in inside 
the proposed framework. 
• All inbound traffic that may contain SNMP network 
traffic protocol from an invalid source. 
• All inbound and outbound traffic which addressed to 
publicize the inside framework addresses. 
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• All inbound and outbound traffic that included the 
target or even source IP domicile of the local host. 
• All inbound traffic, which may include the routing 
information of resource IP domicile. 
• All inbound and outbound traffic that may include 
to target or generated from a source of non-IP 
domicile (0.0.0.0), which is the non-specified IP. 
The distributed firewalls are supposed to block all inbound 
traffic except that traffic, which is clearly required to 
inbound with the server connections, which are secured by 
the demilitarized zone. The Table I is shown the 
generalized policy to manage the inbound and outbound 
network traffic. 
 
As the firewall logs are showing in Table III to protect the 
proposed framework from the firewall view following 
notes also needs to be consider: 
• The proposed firewall model is to be implemented 
on a system which should not be occupied by the 
redundant applications and itself should cynical 
pastille to assail, by the means of all the security 
patches, which may be required for the security 
purpose in Linux is utilized and always is under take 
by the administrative view. 
• The distributed packet filtering firewalls need 
particularly backup, which not be supposed to on 
any inside or outside of the proposed framework 
client or server which itself can be a perspective of 
the security hole to the proposed framework. 
• The synchronization mechanism between the DPFF 
should be appropriately done and the consideration 
of their log activity on the time based is required.  
 
 
 
• In addition to above notifications the validation of 
the procedure and examinations to the stored logs 
and latest policy activity is required to minimize the 
unknown incident. 
• In SMTP for the mail server activity, the following 
table (Table II) content should be considered [22], 
and block to avoid the internal explosion, which 
typically should define on remote antivirus as well. 
Table 1: Sample of Policy Rules Based on The Protocol 
 
 
Fig. 3 Sample of FlowGraph of SYN/FIN/ACK During Experiment 
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Table 2: File Extension for Smtp Exchange 
 
4.3 Implementation of DPFF Policy 
It depends on the proposed framework architecture the 
following policy is implemented as the minimum 
requirement: 
 
• The source address of the packet which initiated 
from layer three should be generated from an IP 
domicile. 
• The target address of the packet which initiated from 
layer three should be generated from an IP domicile. 
• Based on the forth layer communication, inbound 
and outbound packets should contain correlated 
ports and protocols for the source as well as the 
target. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 are shown various protocols 
and their related percentage that contained in the 
experiment. 
• The inbound and outbound traffic from the source/ 
to a target regularly could be Ethernet in layer two 
and also IP at layer three, which shows the type of 
traffic. 
• To collect all the activity logs naturally then the 
packets are dropped are not logged by the firewall 
but in the proposed model all the activities are 
recorded as well as denied and dropped action. 
 
The firewall policy can be accumulating after 
implementation the applications traffic and based on the 
firewall the network traffic controlled. To avoid the 
unintentionally firewall bad activity or whole policies are 
simple as much as is possible that also help in unauthorized 
firewall traverse traffic. 
4.4 Proposed Policy Algorithm 
In consideration of actively work on the traffic and have the 
best performance of the firewall and also optimize the 
traffic at least an amount by optimizing the algorithm [11, 
24], and the requirement to classify the various relations 
and connections among the firewall rules and policy [28], 
and to match all the traffics by investigation in between the 
rules and policies based on the following definition and 
activity the respective process is generated. 
 
Each portion of the traffic is defined as the split of the 
whole amount of traffic, so for each portion every header 
packet corresponded precisely to the similar collection of 
the rules and also neither any other associated part of the 
packet nor even the packets can have this similarity for this 
particular rules’ collection. This is by mean of every packet 
is only fitted into a similar portion, and it is impossible to 
tell apart from the other inspection of the whole firewall 
policy having the similar header. 
  
To define these portions, it should mention that the 
included rules to apply for the particular space is defined as 
Rin and similarly the exclude rules are Rout, also AddSp is in 
place of Boolean expression of the address space and 
finally action of the firewall for that particular space based 
on the initiate rule to the end of the list indicate by action. 
 
Fig. 4 Number of Various Packets in Protocol 
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To clear the viewpoints of this algorithm, which assemble a 
record of portions that is based on the policy interface and 
communication is each time after acknowledgment of the 
portion it initiated at the portion as the input and 
interconnects through the Rin to the effectual rules of the 
policy (Reff). In this situation, there is a condition that, in 
case the included rule has the unfilled record then the 
action to this portion is considered as default and in the 
reverse case it will be the base on the priority of the rule 
and based on their arrangements. In this algorithm (Fig. 6), 
the For loops are responsible to oblige and influence of the 
whole portions and calling them to be included in the loop. 
The include and exclude portions, IncludePor and 
ExcludePor are represented for the present procedure of the 
portions to include or exclude between the rule and the 
portion, and also somehow break portion into the contain or 
un-contain regions, which mean by abundant the portion as 
the unbroken space for the excludes the portion in case the 
portion and the rule are not interconnected, but in the 
reverse case for the include the rule will be covering whole 
of the portion.  
 
Here, there is the necessity of the provision situation for the 
portion to avoid of the unfilled portion construction. 
Finally, based on this expansion the algorithm can have the 
result of doubling of the portion subsequent to dealing out 
of the n rules of the policy and consequential has the record 
of 2n portions based on this escalation. This algorithm is 
based to the continued algorithm and wisely chose the 
packets and covers the whole space of the packets in the 
proper way. Typically, by utilizing this algorithm the 
address space divided into portions according to the rule, 
and each portion takes the particular address space and 
based on the priority each portion is considered. So, the 
rules of policy from every portion are pulling out, and the 
production and outcome will log to consider for the 
firewall, and the complexity is resulted as O(2n).
 
Fig. 5  Percentage of Various Protocols in Firewall Experiment 
 
Fig. 6 Portion-wised Rules for Policy Algorithm 
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4.5 Policy Configuration 
Currently there is a lack in firewall configuration to be as a 
semantic and a typical language define. Based on the 
various unique configuration in high level configuration 
language, which proposed to be a semantics in firewall 
languages for access policy that mostly working on access 
control policy in network management these mis-
configurations are clearer [10]. In the proposed model, the 
firewall configuration to be interpreting in semantics is 
working and configured by XML syntax, which is 
commanded to the high-level access control in network 
policies, and it is derived from different layer of defense. 
This method is clearly semantics in policy configuration 
and as well as update mechanism to indicate a unique 
framework security policy. Fig. 7 is presented the variety of 
policy rules in terms of portions at updating mechanism. 
This method greatly gives the ease of administrative of the 
framework and minimizes the probability of the mis-
configuration in the security policy. 
 
Fig. 7 Number of DPFF Policy Rules in terms of Portions 
4.6 DPFF Policy Updating 
To the view of firewall activity, updating is a complicated 
procedure to keep the firewall always in development part 
and never end. As new threats, unauthorized IP domicile 
and protocol activity are carried out, the new patches and 
updating procedure should response to the evolving 
insecure activities [1]. In the proposed framework, the 
DPFF is under control and development to be update 
through their policies by administrator undertake and 
examine all updating procedure which applicable to the 
firewalls. The status of updating mechanism and minimum 
network bandwidth consumption is shown in Fig. 8. 
4.7 Log Analyzer  
The out come of the prior experiment are initiated in the 
firewall log (Table III) and the finest technique to 
performance of the analyzer is to check and analyze the 
iptables. 
 
To achieve a considerable field in the log file every record 
of log is analyses and saved separately. Here it should 
include that merely functional and valuable data is kept 
separately at it has shown in the Table IV, for further 
processing that may sustain and useless information is not 
concern. These significant data aims to packet structure 
with their assessment and store them individually for 
addition testing. The Table IV is shown this significant 
information. 
 
In the same way as the logged packets, are only the decline 
packets, all the logged packets which are related with the 
determination are dropped, and the rest packets are allied 
with the allow verdict. As we have implemented the KMy 
firewall to aim for analyze [9], and implementation of the 
update policy and log analyzer the graphic user interface is 
simply helping for the compression and analyzer 
monitoring.  
5. Conclusions and Future Works 
Firewalls are utilized typically to be the main layer of 
security in the network framework. This chapter is 
presented the particular segment of the proposed 
framework that DPFF based on the iptable firewall to be 
the layers of defense, which is protected front and backend 
of the framework with a dynamic security and policy 
update to control the framework’s safeguard. A firewall 
policy commands how the network traffic bypasses and 
handles by firewall and traffic applications handled. The 
applicable policy also illustrates the firewall updating and 
restriction. Establish of firewall policy is to support the 
traffic application, and establish of firewall rules based on 
the IP domicile, ports and protocol. 
 
Table 3: Sample of Collected Log 
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Fig. 8 Analyze of Rules Updating 
Table 4: Require Data From Collected Log 
 
 
The update mechanism has the following characteristics 
that, new policy is formed and appended at the initiation of 
the existing policy. New updated policy is created without 
almost any similar rules. After the firewall updating and 
new configuration, the proposed implemented firewall has 
the distinctiveness that the firewall policies rules are based 
on the defined and develop rules’ manage the firewall to be 
utilized. 
 
For accuracy in detection and removing possible mis-
configuration from the updated policy, it seems 
rectification algorithms, which determine potential errors, 
and also investigation in redundancy and shadowing is 
required. 
 
 
References 
[1] E. Al-Shaer, and H. Hamed, “Firewall Policy Advisor for 
anomaly discovery and rule editing”. Integrated Network 
Management, IFIP/IEEE Eighth International Symposium 
on, 2003, pp. 17–30. 
[2] AusCERT, “Australian computer crime and security survey”, 
Australian Computer Emergency Response Team. 2005, 
Technical Report, http://www.auscert.org.au/crime survey. 
[3] S. M. Bellovin, “Distributed firewalls.  Login: The Magazine 
of USENIX & SAGE”, 1999, pp. 39-47. 
[4] M. Bishop, “Early computer security papers, part 1”, 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/ history/ index.html. 1998. 
[5] M. Bishop, “What is computer security?” IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol. 1, no. 1, 2003, pp. 67-69. 
[6] M. Bishop, “Computer Security: Art and Science”. Addison-
Wesley ed.  2003. 
[7] W. R. Cheswick, S. M. Bellovin, and A. D. Rubin, 
“Firewalls and Internet security: repelling the wily hacker”, 
Second Edition. 2003. 
[8] M. Coetzee, and J. H. Eloff, “Virtual enterprise access 
control requirements”, In Proceedings of Annual Research 
Conference of the South African institute of Computer 
Scientists and information Technologists on Enablement 
Through Technology. ACM International Conference 
Proceeding Series, vol. 47. South African Institute for 
Computer Scientists and Information Technologists, 2003, 
pp. 285-294. 
[9] J. Corbet, “Review of Tomato firewall”, 2010, http://lwn. 
net/ Articles/369367. 
[10] N. Cuppens, T. Cuppens, Sans, and A. Miege, “A formal 
approach to specify and deploy a network security policy,” In 
Proc. of the 2nd Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security 
and Trust (FAST), Toulouse, France. 2004. 
[11] El-Atawy, K. Ibrahim, H. Hamed, , and E. Al-Shaer, “Policy 
Segmentation for Intelligent Firewall Testing”, In 1st IEEE 
ICNP Workshop on Secure Network Protocols, 2005, pp. 67-
72. 
[12] J. D. Guttman, “Filtering postures: Local enforcement for 
global policies”, Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy. IEEE, Oakland, CA, pp. 120-129, 
1997. 
[13] J. D. Guttman, “How to do things with cryptographic 
protocols”, ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 6, No 2, November 2011 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 216
computing science conference on Advances in computer 
science: computer and network security, 2007, pp. 142-149. 
[14] M. Hamdi, and N. Boudriga, “Algebraic specification of 
network security risk management”, In Proceedings of the 
2003 ACM Workshop on Fonnal Methods in Security 
Engineering (Washington, D.C.). FMSE '03. ACM Press, 
New York, NY, 2003, pp. 52-60. 
[15] L. Huang, Z. Weinberg, C. Evans, C. Jackson, “Protecting 
Browsers from Cross-Origin CSS Attacks”, In Proc of the 
17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security (CCS 2010), New York, NY, USA, 2010, pp. 619-
629. 
[16] International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 
17799:2005, Code of Practice for Information Security 
Management, 2005. 
[17] S. Ioannidis, A. D. Keromytis, S. M. Bellovin, and J. M. 
Smith, “Implementing a distributed firewall”, In Samarati, P. 
Ed., Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Computer 
and Communications Security (Athens, Greece, November 
01 - 04, 2000). CCS '00. ACM Press, New York, NY, 2000, 
pp. I90-199. 
[18] C. Jackson, and A. Barth, “Beware of finer-grained origins”, 
In Web 2.0 Security and Privacy (W2SP), 2008a. 
[19] C. Jackson, and A. Barth, “Force HTTPS: Protecting high-
security web sites from network attacks”, In Proceedings of 
the 17th International World Wide Web Conference 
(WWW), April 2008b. 
[20] S. B. John, “Simulation of Large Networks: Modeling and 
Simulation of Telecommunication Networks for Control and 
Management”, in Proceedings of the 35th Conference on 
Winter Simulation: Driving Innovation, New Orleans, 
Louisiana, 2003, pp. 431-440. 
[21] M. M. Kadhum, and S. Hassan, “A New Congestion 
Management Mechanism for Next Generation Routers”, 
Journal of Engineering Science and Technology, vol. 3, 
2008, pp. 265-271. 
[22] D. Moore, V. Paxson, S. Savage, C. Shannon, S. Staniford, 
and N. Weaver, “Inside the Slammer worm”, IEEE Security 
& Privacy, vol. 1, no. 4, 2003, pp. 33– 39. 
[23] J. M. Myerson, “Identifying enterprise network 
vulnerabilities”, Int. Journal of Network Management. Vol. 
12, No. 3, 2002, pp. 135-144. 
[24] Netspoc: “a network security policy compiler”, http://netspoc 
.berlios.de/. January 2011. 
[25] V. N. Padmanabhan, and D. R. Simon, “Secure Trace route 
to detect faulty or malicious routing”, ACM SIGCOMM 
Computer Communications Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2003, 
pp. 77–82. 
[26] M. E. Whitman, “Enemy at the gate: threats to information 
security”, Communication of the ACM Vol. 46, No. 8, 
August 2003, pp. 91-95. 
[27] L. Yuan, J. Mai, Z. Su, H. Chen, C. Chuah, and P. 
Mohapatra, “FIREMAN: A Toolkit for FIREwall Modeling 
and Analysis”, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 
2006, pp. 199–213.   
[28] B. Zhang, E. Al-Shaer, R. Jagadeesan, J. Riely, and C. 
Pitcher, “Specifications of a high-level conflict-free firewall 
policy language for multi-domain networks”, Proceedings of 
the 12th ACM symposium on Access control models and 
technologies, 2007, pp. 185–194. 
[29] E. D. Zwicky, S. Cooper, and D. B. Chapman, “Building 
Internet Firewalls”, 2nd ed., O’Rei1ly & Associated, 2000. 
 
Harleen Kaur gained her Ph.D. in Computer Science from Jamia 
Millia Islamia University, New Delhi, India on the topic of 
Applications of Data Mining techniques in Health care 
Management. She graduated from the University of Delhi, New 
Delhi. She has previously served as a Lecturer in Computer 
Science, University of Delhi. Currently, she is an Assistant 
Professor at the Department of Computer Science, Hamdard 
University. She has published numerous research articles in 
refereed international journals and conference proceedings and 
chapters in an edited book. She is a member of several 
international bodies. Her main research interests are in the fields 
of Data analysis with applications to medical databases, Medical 
decision making, Fuzzy logic, Information Retrieval, Bayesian 
networks and visualization. 
Omid Mahdi Ebadati Esfahani is a senior Ph.D. Scholar in 
Hamdard University, New Delhi, India. He received his MSc 
degree in Computer Science from Hamdard University, New 
Delhi, India with top student academic award. He has published 
numerous international research papers in conferences and 
journals in computer networks field. He is a member of IEEE, 
IEEE Computer Society, IACSIT and currently reviewer of 
different IEEE conferences and peer-reviewed journals. His 
research interest includes computer networks, network security 
and Wireless Sensor Networks.  
M. Afshar Alam is a Professor in Computer Science and former 
Head, Department of Computer Science, former Dean Faculty of 
Management and Information Technology, at the Hamdard 
University, New Delhi, India. In 1997-2000, he founded the 
Department of Computer Science, Hamdard University. He was 
also founder of Computer Centre at Hamdard University. He 
received his Master degree in Computer Application from the 
Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh and Ph.D. from Jamia Millia 
Islamia University, New Delhi. His research interests include 
Fuzzy logic, Software engineering, Networking and 
Bioinformatics. He is the author of over 60 publications in 
International/ National journals, conference and chapter in an 
edited book. He is a member of expert committee AICTE, DST, 
UGC and Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), 
New Delhi, India. His latest books are: Application Software 
Reengineering, Pearson Education India, 2010, and Advanced 
Signal Analysis and Its Applications to Mathematical Physics, IK 
International Publishing House, 2009. 
 
IJCSI International Journal of Computer Science Issues, Vol. 8, Issue 6, No 2, November 2011 
ISSN (Online): 1694-0814 
www.IJCSI.org 217
